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PRICE-FIXING UNDER N. I. R. A. CODES
The National Industrial Recovery Act, effective June 16,
1933, empowers the President to formulate and establish
so-called Codes of Fair Competition for trades and indus-
tries throughout the United States, either upon the applica-
tion of trade groups or associations or upon his own initia-
tive. The Act does not specify or even outline in.a general
way what provisions shall be put into the codes, and con-
tains no limitation upon the President's power to incorporate
in them anything he may think proper, except that no regu-
lation under the Act shall prevent an individual from pur-
suing his vocation of manual labor or from marketing or
trading the produce of his farm.
The Recovery Act starts out by declaring the existence
of a national emergency "which burdens interstate and for-
eign commerce, affects the public welfare, and undermines
the standards of living of the American people." It then de-
clares it to be the policy of the Act "to remove obstructions
to the free flow of interstate and foreign commerce which
tend to diminish the amount thereof;" and "to provide for
the general welfare by promoting the organization of in-
dustry for the purpose of cooperative action among trade
groups." The policy of Congress is further declared to be
to induce and maintain united action of labor and manage-
ment, to eliminate unfair competitive practices, to promote
the fullest possible utilization of the productive capacity
of industries, to avoid undue restriction of production, to
increase consumption by increasing purchasing power, to re-
duce and relieve unemployment, to improve standards of
labor, and otherwise to rehabilitate industry and conserve
natural resources.
The Recovery Act does not contemplate that the binding
force of the respective codes upon the individuals or cor-
porations affected shall be, in any respect, dependent upon
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their consent or voluntary choice; they are bound whether
they agree or not. The Act says that the provisions of the
codes, when approved and promulgated by the President,
shall constitute the standards of fair competition for their
respective trades and industries; that any violation of such
standards "in any transaction in or affecting interstate or
foreign commerce" shall be deemed an unfair method of
competition, and that it shall constitute a misdemeanor sub-
jecting the offender to a fine of not more than $500 for each
day that such violation continues. The Act also vests juris-
diction in the federal district courts to prevent and restrain
such violations, in proceedings for that purpose instituted
by the district attorneys in their respective districts under
the direction of the attorney general.
The above-quoted references to interstate commerce in-
dicate that Congress relied, for its power to enact this legis-
lation, upon that part of Article 1, Section 8, of the Federal
Constitution which says that Congress shall have power "to
regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the
several states." The use of the words "to provide for the
general welfare" in the declaration of policy in the first
section of the Act might indicate that its authors had in
mind, as a further source of congressional power, the words
"in order to promote the general welfare" in the preamble
to the Constitution.
It seems, however, to be generally conceded, even in the
cases in which certain of the federal courts have sustained
the validity of codes under the Recovery Act, that Congress
cannot legislate for "the general welfare" except upon the
subjects and within the limits to which its legislative power
is confined by the specific provisions of the Federal Consti-
tution. Nor did the courts, in the cases referred to, seem to
regard the emergency declared by the Recovery Act to exist
as creating or giving rise to any power which Congress did
not otherwise possess. The decisions in all the cases in which
the federal courts have considered the codes have turned
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upon the question whether or not they were within the pow-
er of Congress to regulate interstate commerce.
The general nature and scope of the regulations and re-
strictions imposed by the President upon the various trades
and industries, by means of the codes promulgated by him,
are illustrated by the provisions of certain of these codes
which have come up before the federal courts for considera-
tion, either in criminal prosecutions or injunctive proceed-
ings. Among these are the provisions of the cleaners and
dyers code requiring that a certain minimum price be
charged for such services; prohibiting the retail sale of build-
ing materials at less than actual cost; forbidding the giving
away of premiums to customers in the retail sale of gasoline;
limiting lumber mills to a certain percentage of their normal
productive capacity and to certain weekly operating time;
prescribing minimum wages and hours of labor in the bitumi-
nous coal industry; prohibiting the working of more than
two shifts of forty hours weekly in the manufacture of
hosiery; prescribing minimum wages and hours and other
requirements in the sale of live poultry; and requiring pe-
troleum producers to keep records, make reports, and sub-
mit to inspection, in order to prevent them from exceeding
their production quotas.
It will be noted, therefore, that the powers asserted and
exercised by the President in the codes established for the
various trades and industries include the fixing of prices
for commodities and services, the dictation of minimum
wages and maximum hours for labor, and the restriction of
output and production by allotments and quotas. The Re-
covery Act does not expressly empower the President to in-
corporate any of these things into the codes established by
him; it merely authorizes him to promulgate codes for the
various industries, without prescribing any of their provi-
sions or limiting the President in any respect as to what he
should put into them.
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It will be impossible, within the limits of this article, to
give attention to all the different features of the various
codes that have been considered by the courts. This discus-
sion will, therefore, be confined to two decisions in which it
was directly held that Congress, by virtue of its power to
regulate interstate commerce, could authorize the President
to include provisions fixing the prices of commodities and
services in the codes established by him.
In United States v. Spotless Dollar Cleaners 1 the Federal
District Court of the Southern District of New York en-
joined the defendant from performing certain retail clean-
ing and dyeing services for less than the minimum prices
fixed by the code. The defendant, a New York corporation,
operated thirty-two stores in New York City, at which the
service of dry-cleaning and processing incidental thereto was
offered to the public. It delivered the clothing received from
its customers to a corporation across the Hudson river in
New Jersey, which was under the same control and manage-
ment as the defendant. Customers came in contact only with
the defendant in New York and were unaware that their
clothing would be sent to New Jersey for processing; but
every garment in fact went to New Jersey and was returned
to New York. District Judge Knox said, in the opinion:
"I cannot but believe that service contracts made by the defendant
with relation to physical subject matter which necessarily must move
regularly, usually, and in large volume across the boundary line of ad-
joining states, is commerce, both in theory and in fact."
The evidence showed that there were a number of dry-
cleaning establishments in New York which, like the de-
fendant, habitually sent their customers' clothing to certain
wholesale cleaning plants in New Jersey, and that, since the
defendant refused to adhere to the minimum code prices,
these New Jersey plants had lost the trade of retail stores
situated in New York.
1 6 F. Supp. 725 (S. D. N. Y. 1934).
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Judge Knox summed up by saying that "such price cut-
ting as has occurred has seriously impeded and changed the
customary and usual flow of interstate commerce in the dry-
cleaning industry between the states of New York and New
Jersey. If defendant be permitted to continue its unfair
prices, further changes in such currents and flow are in-
evitable, and these will contribute to the frustration of the
purposes of the National Industrial Recovery Act .... In
order to overcome tendencies which divert and stem move-
ments in interstate commerce, Congress may act as it has,
and is competent to authorize this court to take such steps
as will allow interstate trade to be conducted in smoother
channels and in accordance with the execution of policies
that are believed to be wise and expedient. .. . And who
can rightly say, with assurance, that governmental price-
fixing when confined to transactions in interstate commerce.
is not a means reasonably adapted to the legitimate ends
which Congress seeks to serve? . . . In rendering this de-
cision, I know full well that it may be a distinct step beyond
the boundaries which, in peace times, have been said to
circumscribe the powers of the Congress."
That Congress, as incident to the power to regulate inter-
state commerce, may delegate to the President the power
to fix the prices a merchant must charge for his goods is
franklv asserted by Judge Donohoe of the Federal District
of Nebraska in United States v. Canfield Lumber Co.2 The
defendant, a retail dealer in Omaha, was enjoined from sell-
ing building materials at less than actual cost, plus cost of
handling and selling and administrative expense, as com-
puted under the provisions of the retail lumber dealers'
code. It put advertisements in Omaha newspapers circulating
in Iowa and other states offering to sell -lumber at prices
below the minimum cost prices established under authority
of the code. Its materials were purchased in the western tim-
ber country and shipped to its yard in Omaha, where they
2 7 F. Supp. 694 (D. C. Neb. 1934).
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were sold in small lots to customers solicited to some extent
through the advertisements referred to. The evidence showed
one sale to an Iowa customer and prices quoted to another
with knowledge that the lumber was to be used in Iowa.
A witness from Iowa stated that the lumber trade in his
community had fallen off, due to the prices advertised by
the defendant, and it did not appear that the defendant, in
selling lumber, took any precaution to find out whether it
was to be transported to another state.
Judge Donohoe said:
"The defendant, like other lumber dealers, engaged in interstate
commerce to obtain its stock or supplies for sale. Then in this case,
this defendant in turn engaged in interstate commerce for the purpose
of obtaining customers. Without employing interstate commerce, its
business, like other dealers, could not exist. Tjhe whole operation is so
closely allied and connected with interstate commerce and so affects
interstate commerce generally that, to our mind, brings this business
clearly within the regulatory power of Congress."
In the New York case, the cleaner's regular course of busi-
ness was held to "affect" interstate commerce, and there-
fore to be subject to price-fixing, because his cutting the
price below the minimum fixed by the code caused certain
New Jersey cleaning establishments to lose some of the
business they formerly received from New York. In the
Nebraska case, the selling by the Omaha lumber dealer be-
low the code price caused the lumber trade in Iowa to fall
off. Thus, according to the court's reasoning in each of these
cases, interstate commerce was adversely affected. But Con-
gress has never, in any law enacted by it, nor has any court,
in interpreting a law of Congress, declared it to be the func-
tion of Congress, under its power to regulate interstate com-
merce, to see to it that the people of one state do more or
less business than the people of another state, so long as
the avenues and facilities of commerce are free and open
to all upon equal terms. The theory that the ebb and flow
of commerce from one state to another, caused by ordinary
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competition, can be controlled or interfered with by Con-
gress, through federal agencies, is entirely novel and unprec-
edented.
In the case of the Omaha lumber company, the court laid
stress upon the fact, also, that its stock in trade had been
transported to its yard from the western timber country
through the medium of interstate commerce. The lumber,
however, had come to rest in its Omaha yard, and therefore
had lost its interstate character, before it was offered for
sale or sold in the transactions complained of as violations
of the code in the case referred to. Whether the dealer ac-
quired his stock in interstate commerce or not could cer-
tainly have no bearing on the power of Congress, through
the codes under the Recovery Act, to fix the price that he
must get for it after it was no longer in transit and had be-
come his absolute property.
The court held that the lumber was subject to code price-
fixing because the dealer's course of business permitted it
to be sold and moved across the state line into Iowa, just as
in the New York case the cleaner's regular routine was to
send his customers' clothing across the line into New Jersey.
Assuming, however, that these incidental movements across
state lines did partake, in some degree, of the nature of
interstate commerce, it does not follow that the regulatory
power of Congress with respect to such commerce would
extend to fixing the price of the articles of merchandise or
of the services entering into it.
The same reasoning would justify the President in pro-
claiming a code fixing the price a tailor in New York must
charge for a suit of clothes, where, for example, he takes
his customer's measure and sells him a suit from a bolt of
cloth in his shop in New York, but afterwards sends it to
a journeyman in New Jersey to be cut out and made up. It
is impossible to imagine any transaction in commodities or
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services involving fabrication, repairing or processing in
which some such incidental movement across state lines
might not occur.
Let us consider for a moment the mail-order business,
where the customer in New Jersey, for instance, sends his
order to the merchant in New York for some article to be
shipped to him in New Jersey. Judge Knox said, with re-
gard to the cleaning contracts in the case above referred to,
that they were properly subject to code price-fixing because
they were made "with relation to physical subject matter
which necessarily must move regularly, usually, and in large
volume across the boundary line of adjoining states." That
statement would be even more true of the contracts resulting
from orders received by mercantile concerns in one state for
goods to be shipped to customers in another state. So, if the
fact that the merchandise bought and sold must necessarily
be moved across state lines is to be the criterion, the Presi-
dent's price-fixing power under the Recovery Act would be
practically boundless.
The opinions in the New York and Nebraska cases just
discussed, as well as the opinions in other cases wherein the
federal courts have sustained the validity of various code
provisions under the Recovery Act, cite a number of de-
cisions of the Supreme Court of the United States involving
the power of Congress over interstate commerce. In none
of the legislation considered and interpreted in those de-
cisions did Congress assert the right to regulate interstate
commerce by fixing the price of commodities moving there-
in, or anything approximating such power. The subjects con-
sidered in the Supreme Court decisions cited in the cases up-
holding the Recovery Act and code provisions thereunder
may be classified as follows:
Orders of the interstate commerce commission requiring
intrastate railroad rates to be increased, in order not to dis-
criminate against interstate rates for substantially the same
distances;
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The federal employers' liability law, upheld for the reason
that it is within the power of Congress to regulate the rela-
tions between railway carriers and their employees while
both are engaged in interstate commerce;
The Act of Congress punishing forgery and utterance of
bills of lading for fictitious shipments in interstate com-
merce;
The Mann Act, prohibiting the transportation of women
in interstate commerce for immoral purposes;
Rates and charges for facilities and services in stockyards,
and practices in connection with live stock passing through
the same, under the Packers and Stockyards Act and the
regulations of the Secretary of Agriculture pursuant thereto;
Regulation of boards of trade by the Secretary of Agricul-
ture under the Grain Futures Act;
The Webb-Kenyon law, forbidding the interstate trans-
portation of intoxicating liquors intended to be shipped into
a state where its possession or sale is unlawful;
The Act of Congress forbidding the interstate transporta-
tion of stolen automobiles;
The Act of Congress forbidding the interstate transporta-
tion of lottery tickets;
Order of the Federal Trade Commission declaring it un-
fair for concerns blending flour purchased from others to do
business under names indicating that they were grinders of
the grain; and
Combinations in restraint of interstate commerce in viola-
tion of the Sherman Anti-Trust Law.
It is evident from the foregoing summary that Congress,
in legislating under its power to regulate interstate com-
merce, has heretofore gone no farther than to guard against
unfair, discriminatory and dishonest practices in the man-
agement and operation of the facilities and instrumentalities
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by which such commerce is carried on, such as railways,
stockyards and boards of trade; to prevent interstate trans-
portation facilities from being used for certain unlawful, im-
moral and contraband purposes, and to forbid monopolies
and conspiracies in restraint of interstate commerce. Clear-
ly, therefore, Congress has never hitherto interpreted its
power to "regulate" interstate commerce to mean anything
more than to keep it and its channels and instrumentalities
free from unfair, dishonest, immoral and illegal practices
and uses. No precedent is to be found in what Congress up
to the present time has done in the regulation of interstate
commerce to support the theory that, under the power to
"regulate," it can fix prices. Even the Recovery Act itself
is silent as to any such enlargement of congressional power.
Thus the federal courts which have upheld the price-fix-
ing provisions of codes under the Recovery Act on the
ground that they are within the power of Congress to regu-
late interstate commerce have done so without any actual
precedents to guide them. The question is really new and
no previous pronouncement by the Supreme Court can be
relied upon to solve it. The power asserted under the price-
fixing codes is to go into the local merchant's place of busi-
ness and dictate the price of the commodities that he sells,
not alone the price of those commodities that the customer
intends to or may incidentally remove across the line into
another state, but also the price of those commodities which
are intended to remain, and do remain, wholly within the
state in which they are purchased.
A sale and delivery wholly within a particular state to a
customer who does not remove the commodities purchased
into another state is a purely intrastate transaction. But the
right to fix the price in such a transaction is nevertheless as-
serted on the ground that Congress may regulate intrastate
business if it "affects" interstate commerce. The theory is
thus expressed by Judge Knox in the Spotless Dollar- Clean-
ers case: "If the defendant engages in interstate commerce
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directly, or if its intrastate business affects the free flow of
the interstate trade of others, its acts are subject to the
restraint here sought." (Italics are mine.) And Judge Dono-
hoe, in the Canfield Lumber Company case, says that he is
brought to the inevitable conclusion that "that which af-
fects -interstate commerce in a substantial or a direct way,
whether it be wholly interstate commerce or partly inter-
state and partly intrastate, or even an intrastate transac-
tion alone, may be regulated by Congress." (Italics are
mine.)
The power of Congress under the Constitution is to "reg-
ulate" interstate commerce. In determining the validity of
the price-fixing codes as an attempted exercise of that pow-
er, the first question that arises is whether, even if Congress
has the power itself to fix prices as a means of regulation,
that power was, in fact, delegated to the President by the
Recovery Act. That the Act does not explicitly do so is cer-
tain. Assuming, however, that the Recovery Act delegates
to the President all the power that Congress itself might
exercise in the premises, the next question that arises is
whether the word "regulate" is broad enough to include the
power to fix the prices of commodities even if they are un-
questionably within the scope of interstate commerce. And
when it is sought to extend that power to the fixing of prices
in purely intrastate transactions, there arises the further
question whether or not it constitutes an invasion of the re-
served rights of the several states.
The second question just referred to, as to whether the
power to fix prices is included within the power to regulate,
requires us to consider the meaning and effect of price-
fixing. The right to determine for oneself, by the exercise
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of personal judgment, the price at which to sell merchan-
dise or other property is the vital characteristic of owner-
ship. To compel a merchant to hold his. goods until he can
obtain a certain fixed price for them, and to refrain from
selling them at a price satisfactory to him, is to divest him
of all control over his property and business and vest it in
the superior power. Control is the most essential element of
ownership, and it might well be argued that such an asser-
tion of authority by Congress would violate the due process
clause of the Federal Constitution.
As previously stated, the government asserts the right
under the Recovery Act to establish codes fixing the price
of commodities sold in purely intrastate business, on the
theory that they "affect" interstate commerce. Under the
Agricultural Adjustment Act, also, the same contention was
made with regard to the price to be paid by local distributors
for locally produced milk. The Secretary of Agriculture pro-
mulgated a price-fixing code for milk in the Oklahoma City
area, which came before the Federal District Court of the
Western District of Oklahoma .in the case of Douglas v.
Wallace,I decided October 17, 1934. It was admitted that
none of the milk in question passed beyond the limits of
the state, but that all of it was produced, sold and con-
sumed within the state. The court held that the fixing of
prices to be paid by the local distributors was an unwar-
ranted attempt to regulate purely intrastate commerce, and
therefore unconstitutional.
A number of other decisions not yet fully reported, some
upholding and others denying the validity of price-fixing
codes, have been rendered by some of the federal district
8 8 F. Supp. 379 (W. D. Okla. 1934).
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courts, but as yet none of these cases have reached the circuit
courts of appeals or the Supreme Court. It is announced,
however, that at least one case involving some of the provi-
sions of the codes under the Recovery Act will be submitted
to the Supreme Court in the near future, and a decision is to
be expected before the expiration of the Act next June, when
Congress will be called upon to determine what part, if
any, of the Recovery Act it will continue in force. Never
since its foundation has the Supreme Court been faced with
a more serious responsibility, nor have the people of the
United States ever had more at stake than now hangs upon
the court's solution of the constitutional issues involved.
W. C. Dorsey.
Omaha, Nebraska.
